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WHAT EVERYONE SHOULD KNOW ABOUT
THE COPYRIGHT LAW IN WONDERLAND
HENRY TSENG*
INTRODUCTION
The Copyright Act of March 4, 1909,1 as amended, was enacted
"to promote the progress of science and the useful arts" pursuant to
the United States Constitution. Anyone who has a certain amount of
dealings in the area of copyright, however, is fully aware of our
anachronic and outmoded copyright law.
Many aspects of the technological advances of the twentieth
century were unheard of when the old law was drafted. If one sits
down and thinks about what has happened to mass communications
since 1909, one can come up with quite a long list: silent and, later,
sound motion pictures; radio and, later, television and, still later,
cable and pay-television; computers and their ability to assimilate,
generate, and manipulate unlimited amounts of information;
satellites and their potential for reaching and linking everyone on
earth; sound recordings and, later, audio and video tape recordings;
photocopying and microreprography; and automation in the composi-
tion and reproduction of printed matter. This certainly does not ex-
haust the list, and many of these developments combine and in-
teract, providing nationwide and worldwide networks for quick or
instantaneous dissemination of information and entertainment. Ob-
viously, our cold copyright law had not anticipated and can not ade-
quately cope with these new developments.
Congress had attempted several times to overhaul the U.S.
Copyright Law since 1924,' but did not succeed in its efforts until
*Professor of Law and Head Law Librarian, Capital University Law School.
1. Act of March 4, 1909, ch. 320, §§ 1-64, 35 Stat. 1075 as amended 17 U.S.C.
§§ 1 et aeq. (1970) [hereinafter cited as old law].
2. See Goldman, The History of US.A. Copyright Law Revision From 1901
to 1954, in 2 STUDIES ON COPYRIGHT 1101, 1107 (Fisher ed. 1963); Marke, United States
Copyright Revision and Its Legislative History, 70 L. Lm. J. 121, 124 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as Marke].
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1976. Like most complex subjects, the decades-old copyright con-
troversy seemed to generate more heat than light. Everyone agreed
that a new law was needed, but after more than fifty years of
debate there was little consensus on what the new statute should
provide. Ironically, few pieces of legislation in recent years have
been the subject of so many groups' intensive and sustained lobby-
ing. It was, indeed, a "wonder of wonders," a "miracle of miracles,"
when Congress, on September 30, 1976, approved and sent to the
White House S. 22, a long-awaited and much-amended copyright
revision bill which has been aptly described as a "compromise of
compromises." President Gerald R. Ford on October 17, 1976
transformed the copyright revision bill, S. 22, into Public Law 94-553
(90 Stat. 2541). The new statute specifies that, with particular excep-
tions, its provisions are to enter into force on January 1, 1978.1
Therefore, any cause of action in copyright arising before December
31, 1977 will continue to be governed by the 1909 Act. Considering
the three-year statute of limitations in which such an action may be
brought,' the 1909 law can be applicable in these cases until 1981. In
addition, the Transitional Section 103 of the new law also provides
that no work that has fallen into the public domain prior to January
1, 1978 can be renewed under the new law. Thus, for the next fifty-
six years, it is important to know whether publication occurred
before January 1, 1978. If it does, the provisions of the old law will
govern.
It was my original intent to interpret and analyze every provi-
sion of the new law, and hopefully predict how it should work in
practice; but that is not feasible at the present time. One thing is
certain, however; in a series of complex modifications, the new law
deals with the technological revolution of the twentieth century and
will have a major impact on authors, composers, artists, publishers
and users in such industries as broadcasting, cable television, motion
pictures, music and recording, book, magazine and newspaper
publishing, photocopying and computers.
Lawyers and executives working on problems in this area must
contend with a new set of realities. Decision-makers at all levels can
not afford to wait. Now is the time for them to start studying the
3. Revised Copyright Act of 1976, PUB. L. No. 94-533, 90 Stat. 2541 (Oct. 9,
1976) [hereinafter cited as Copyright Act]; Marke, supra note 2, at 121.
4. PuB. L. No. 94-533, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976), Transitional and Supplemental
Provisions § 102.
5. 17 U.S.C. § 115 (1970).
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new law, absorbing the changes that affect them, and making plans
for an orderly transition.
The new law will definitely bring fundamental and pervasive
changes to our day-to-day ways of doing business and to our
copyright system itself. Throughout the country, and indeed the
world, there are countless individuals, organizations and industries
affected by the revisions. As Hon. Barbara Ringer, the U.S. Register
of Copyrights, pointed out,
[flew of them have anything but the vaguest notion of how
they are affected by the changes and what they should be
doing about them. The dangers of costly misunderstan-
dings, damaging mistakes and administrative catastrophes
are very real-much too real to risk muddling through
and hoping for the best between now and ... the effective
date of the new law.6
The Copyright Office is now undertaking to issue regulations, etc.,
pertaining to the new law.'
The focus of this article will be a few of the highlights of the
new law with which everyone involved in business or legal activities
should become familiar. It will be seen that the new law substantial-
ly affects the common law copyright and the duration of copyright
as well as the periods for terminations of copyright transfers. Provi-
sions defining the subject matter and describing the exclusive rights
of copyright will be shown to be essentially unchanged from the old
law. Governmental publications are now specifically regulated by
statute and rights in other works for hire are expressly delineated
covering both works produced by employees and independent con-
tractors.
Additions to the new law will be discussed in some detail.
Wholly new sections include the codification of the old equitable fair
use doctrine and the extremely important provisions governing
reproduction by libraries and archives. The new law creates a
Copyright Royalty Tribunal to oversee royalty rates in regard to
sound recordings, juke boxes and cable television. Regulation of
these three modern areas of concern will be explicated by this arti-
cle as will the various statutory exemptions for productons involv-
6. Ringer, Finding Your Way Around in the New Copyright Law,
PUBLISHERS WEEKLY, Dee. 13, 1976, at 38.
7. Any person who is interested in obtaining further information can write
to: Register of Copyrights, Library of Congress, Washington D.C. 20559.
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ing copyrighted works. Procedural requirements of the new law will
be outlined as well.
Single National System: Its Effect on Unpublished Works
The new law abolishes the old dual system of protecting works
prior to publication under the common law and published works
under federal statute. There is now a single system of statuory pro-
tection for all copyrightable works. A copyright inheres in a work
at the instant of its creation in a tangible form. When writing an ar-
ticle, for example, a federally cognizable copyright exists the mo-
ment the pen is lifted from the paper.
Specifically, under section 301' the copyright law now applies
to all works created after January 1, 1978 whether or not they are
ever published or disseminated, so long as the works involved are
"works of authorship that are fixed in a tangible medium of expres-
sion and come within the subject matter of copyright as specified by
sections 102 and 103."1 As a result, all state laws on copyright,
whether statutory or common law, are preempted and abrogated.
Beginning January 1, 1978 only the federal courts have jurisdiction
over copyright matters. The following three areas, however, are left
unaffected by the pre-emption: (1) works that do not come within
the subject matter of federal copyright law; (2) causes of action aris-
ing under state law before January 1, 1978; and (3) violations of
rights not equivalent to any of the exclusive rights under copyright,
such as unfair competition, deceptive trade practices and misap-
propriation."
Duration of Copyright
The effect of the new law is to generally extend the duration of
a copyright. The new term of copyright will apply to new works
created after January 1, 1978 as well as to unpublished works
already in existence on that date. Provision is also made for existing
works under copyright protection. Finally, the new law changes the
computation of the copyright period to the calendar year standard.
For works created after January 1, 1978 the new law provides
one term of copyright lasting throughout the author's life, plus an
8. See Revised Copyright Act of 1976, Pus. L. No. 94-533, 90 Stat. 2541
(1976).
9. Unless otherwise specified hereinafter all textual references to section
numbers are to the Revised Copyright Act, supra note 3.
10. Copyright Act, supra note 3, at § 301.
11. Id at § 301(b).
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additional fifty years after his death. In cases of works made for
hire, and anonymous or pseudonymous works, the new term will be
seventy-five years from the date of publication or one hundred years
from the time of creation, whichever is shorter."2
Unpublished works already in existence on January 1, 1978,
which are not presently protected by statutory copyright and which
have not yet gone into the public domain, will generally be afforded
the same Federal copyright protection prescribed for new works.
Copyrights in older works of this sort, however, are provided special
dates of termination." The new law does not restore copyright pro-
tection for any work that has gone into the public domain prior to
January 1, 1978.1"
For works already under statutory protection the new law re-
tains the present term of copyright of twenty-eight years from first
publication (or from registration in some cases), renewable by cer-
tain persons for a second period of protection, but increases the
length of the second period to forty-seven years. Copyrights in their
first term must still be renewed to receive the full new maximum
term of seventy-five years. Copyrights in their second term between
December 31, 1976 and December 31, 1977, however, are automa-
tically extended up to the maximum of seventy-five years."
The new law provides further that all terms of copyright shall
run through the end of the calendar year in which they would other-
wise expire."' This method of computation will affect the duration of
copyrights, as well as the time limits for renewal registration.
Termination of Transfers
The transfer termination provisions of the new law are design-
ed to benefit authors. Under the old law, after the first term of
twenty-eight years, the renewal copyright reverted in certain situa-
tions to the author or other specified beneficiaries. The new law
drops the renewal feature except for works already in their first
term of statutory protection on January 1, 1978. Instead, for
transfers of rights made by an author or certain of the author's
12. Id at § 302(a) & (b).
13. Id. at § 303.
14. PuB. L. No. 94-533, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976) Transitional and Supplemental Pro-
visions § 103.
15. Copyright Act, supra note 3, at § 304(a) & (b).
16. Id at § 305.
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heirs after its effective date, the new law generally permits the
author or certain of his heirs to terminate the transfer after thirty-
five years merely by serving written notice on the transferee within
specified time limits. The most significant feature of the new law's
protection is that such a termination of the grant may be effected
notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary."
A similar right of termination is provided for works presently
under statutory copyright protection, but only with respect to
transfers covering those years which extend the present maximum
term of the copyright from fifty-six to seventy-five years. Within
certain time limits, an author or specified heirs of the author are
generally entitled to file a notice terminating the author's transfers
covering any part of the usual ninteen years that have now been ad-
ded to the end of the second term of copyright in a work already
under protection when the new law comes into effect."' The most in-
teresting aspect of this addition to the law is that an author or
copyright claimant, who previously sold away his rights, can reclaim
those last "ninteen years." There are surely some spectacularly
valuable copyrights to which this provision of the law pertains.
Estate settlement checklists should certainly be expanded to deter-
mine if any of these newly copyright properties might be available.
The task of the executor in determining copyright assets of estates
will not be enlarged by any newly includable work as the subject
matter of federal protection remains anchored.
Subject Matter of Copyright
Section 102(a) of the new law provides that copyright protec-
tion subsists in "original works of authorship fixed in any tangible
medium of expression, now known or later developed, from which
they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated,
either directly or witr the aid of a machine or device.""' It should be
noted that the phrase appearing in the old law, "writings of an
author," has been replaced by "original works of authorship."' Thus,
the new law avoids any problem of interpretation with respect to
what "writing" means. What constitutes an "original work of author-
ship," however, has not been changed. The description includes the
following seven categories: (1) literary works; (2) musical works, in-
17. 1& at § 203(a).
18. 1I at 304(c).
19. l at 102(a).
20. Id
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eluding any accompanying words; (3) dramatic works, including any
accompanying music; (4) pantomimes and choreographic works; (5)
pictoral, graphic and sculptural works; (6) motion pictures and other
audio-visual works; and (7) sound recordings." Like the old law, in no
case will copyright protection for an original work of authorship ex-
tend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation,
concept, principle or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is
described, explained, illustrated or embodied in such work.n
Also unchanged under the new law: "The copyright in a com-
pilation or derivative work extends only to the material contributed
by the author of such work, as distinguished from the pre-existing
material employed in the work. . . .. Thus, copyright in new ver-
sions extends only to the new material in the work. Also the new
material can not have any effect upon the nature of any copyright
protection that may exist in the original work iteslf."
Provisions regarding "national origin" extend statutory protec-
tion in the new law to unpublished works "without regard to the na-
tionality or domicile of the author."" Published works of foreign na-
tionals are eligible for United States copyright protection on the
date of first publication if: (1) one of the authors is a national or
domiciliary of the United States or a national or domiciliary of a
foreign nation that is a party to a copyright treaty to which the
United States is a party; or (2) the work is first published in the
United States, or in a foreign nation that is a party to the Universal
Copyright Convention; or (3) the work is published by the United
Nations or any of its specialized agencies, or by the Organization of
American States; or (4) the work comes within the scope of a
presidential proclamation."
As with the subject matter of copyright, the exclusive rights to
which the copyright proprietor is entitled remain essentially the
same. The owner of the copyright is given the exclusive right to
produce, to prepare derivative works, to distribute copies, and to
perform publicly." There is but one change. The new law explicitly
gives the holder of the copyright the right to display the
21. Id
22. Id at § 102(b).
23. Id. at § 103(b).
24. Id.
25. Id. at § 104(a).
26. Id at § 104(b).
27. Id. at § 106(1)-(4).
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copyrighted work publicly in the case of literary, musical, dramatic,
and choreographic works, pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or
sculptural works, including the individual images of a motion picture
or other audio-visual work." Although the categories of subject mat-
ter of copyright and exclusivity of rights have not been altered by
Congress, refinements controlling under what circumstances
copyright may be sought have been made.
Government Publications
Works produced by the U.S. government and its officers and
employees, as part of their official duties are not subject to
copyright protection." The effect of this provision is intended to
place all such works, whether published or unpublished, in the
public domain.
Nevertheless government officials and employees may secure
copyright in works they have written independently, outside their
official duties, even though the subject matter involves their govern-
ment work or professional field. A work privately copyrighted is
protected regardless of subsequent publication by the government.
Works generated by government research contracts, especially
when commissioned by a government agency for its own use, can be
denied copyright when it is in the public interest to do so." The
House Committee on the Judiciary recognizes, however, that there
are some cases where the denial of copyright protection would be
unfair or would hamper the production and publication of important
works. The House Report further suggests that Congress or the
agency involved can remedy this problem by specific legislation,
agency regulation or contractual restriction. 1
It should be noted, however, that prohibition on copyright pro-
tection for United States government works is not intended to have
any effect on the protection provided these works abroad. This is
primarily because works of most foreign governments are
copyrighted.n
Works for Hire
The new law incorporates the basic principle of the old law in
the case of works made for hire. The employer is still considered the
28. Id at § 106(5).
29. Id. at § 105.
30. Copyright Law Revision, H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, 94th Cong. 2d Sess. 59
(1976) [hereinafter cited as HousE REPORT].
31. Id
32. Id.
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author of the work, and is regarded as the initial owner of copyright
absent an agreement to the contrary.'9 Any agreement under which
the employee is to own rights must be in writing and signed by the
parties.' The impact of this provision is a copyright statute of
frauds. No argument on behalf of the employee-author of an implied
ownership of copyright will prevail.
The old law made no provisions for works made on commission
or on special order by independent contractors. It was therefore
within the discretion of courts to interpret the rights in works
created by an independent contractor.8 ' From early decisions, there
evolved a general principle that where a person is engaged (as an in-
dependent contractor) to produce a work capable of copyright pro-
tection, the presumption arises that, in the absence of an express
contractual reservation of copyright in the independent contractor
or artist, the title to the copyright shall be in the person who com-
missioned the work." The new law points to the opposite direction.
If the work is "specially ordered or commissioned" for a certain pur-
pose," the parties must "expressly agree in a written instrument
signed by them that the work shall be considered a work made for
hire."" Without such written agreement, there is absolutely no way
the employer will be considered to own the copyright. For the first
time, the copyright of a commissoned work belongs to the artist
unless the work falls within the statutory definition of "[a] work
made for hire."'"
33. Copyright Act, supra note 3, at § 201(a) & (b). By retaining the old law's
denial of copyright to the author of works made for hire §§ 203(a) and 304(c) rights of
termination naturally do not apply.
34. Copyright Act, aupra note 3, at § 201(b).
35. See, e.g., Brattleboro Publishing Co. v. Winmill Publishing Corp., 369 F.2d
565 (2d Cir. 1966); Lin-Brook Builders Hardware v. Gertler, 352 F.2d 298 (9th Cir.
1965); Lumiere v. Robertson-Cole Distributing Corp., 280 F. 550 (2d Cir. 1922);
Altman v. New Haven Union Co., 254 F. 113 (D. Conn. 1918); Picture Music, Inc. v.
Bourne, Inc., 314 F. Supp. 640 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), affd 457 F.2d 1213 (2d Cir. 1972).
36. Lin-Brook Builders Hardware v. Gertler, 352 F.2d 298 (9th Cir. 1965);
Yardley v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 108 F.2d 28 (2d Cir. 1939); W. H. Anderson Co. v.
Baldwin Law Pub. Co., 27 F.2d 82 (6th Cir. 1928); Grant v. Kellogg Co., 58 F. Supp. 48
(S.D.N.Y. 1944); Dielman v. White, 102 F. 892 (C.C.D. Mass. 1900); Tumey v. Little, 18
Misc. 2d 462, 186 N.Y.S.2d 94 (1959). See also Uproar Co. v. National Broadcasting
Co., 81 F.2d 373 (1st Cir. 1936).
37. Copyright Act, supra note 3, at § 101, limits these purposes to works "for
use as a contribution to a collective work, as a part of a motion picture or other audio-
visual work, as a translation, as a supplementary work, as a compilation, as an instruc-
tional text, as a test, as answer material for a test, or as an atlas ......
38. Copyright Act, supra note 3, at § 101.
39. Id By granting copyright protection to artists of certain commissioned
works, it is important to recognize that the new law also affords these artists the
benefits of transfer terminations provided in §§ 203(a) and 304(c).
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Fair Use Doctrine
The new law adds a provision to the statute specifically
recognizing the principle of "fair use" as a limitation on the ex-
clusive rights of copyright owners, and further indicates the factors
to be considered in determining whether the use made is a "fair
use."40 They are: (1) the purpose and character of the use; (2) the
nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of
the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for a value of the
copyrighted work. With reference to the purpose and character of
the use, Congress added an additional factor to be considered by the
courts to decide whether the "fair use" doctrine applies-a con-
sideration which is of value to scholarly researchers and
educators- namely, "whether such use is of a commercial nature or
is for nonprofit educational purposes."" The House Report explicitly
notes that this provision "is an express recognition that, as under
the present law, the commercial or nonprofit character of an activity
while not conclusive with respect to fair use, can and should be
weighed along with other factors in fair use decisions."a Congress
expects the courts to be free to adapt the doctrine to particular
situations on a case-by-case basis. Thus, section 107 codifies the pre-
sent equitable doctrine of fair use which the courts should apply ac-
cording to the specific facts of a case. The commonly accepted
criteria of "fair use," as now delineated in the new law, provides
that copyrighted works can be reproduced for purposes such as
criticism, comment, newsreporting, teaching, research and things of
a similar nature if those uses are fair."
40. Copyright Act, supra note 3, at § 107.
41. Id. at § 107(1).
42. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 30, at 66.
43. Should you be accosted by your teacher-neighbors for free legal advice vis-
a-vis their playing the xerox machine at school next year, I suggest that you refer
them to the "Agreement on Guidelines for Classroom Copying in Not-For-Profit Educa-
tional Institutions" (West Point could use a copy), prepared by the Ad Hoc Committee
of Educational Institutions and Organizations and others. These guidelines set forth re-
quirements such as spontaneity on the part of the teacher; a limit of one copy per
pupil; brevity, for instance, a copy of a poem can't exceed 250 words; no more than one
copying operation per author, and so on in great detail. The purpose of the guidelines
is to state the minimum standards of educational fair use under section 107 of the new
law. The educational community is not in agreement with these guidelines, considering
them too limiting for pedagogical programs in instutitions of higher learning, such as
professional schools and graduate university programs. The Association of American
Law Schools, for example, has noted its dissatisfaction. Id at 66-72.
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Reproduction by Libraries and Archives
In addition to the provision for "fair use," the new law specifies
circumstances where the making or distribution of single copies of
works by libraries and archives for noncommercial purposes does
not constitute a copyright infringement. For example, it is not an in-
fringement for a library or archives, or any of its employees acting
within the scope of their employment, to reproduce or distribute not
more than one copy or phonorecord of a work under all three of the
following conditions. (1) The reproduction or distribution is made
without any purpose of direct or indirect commercial advantage. (2)
The collections of the library or archives are open to the public or
available not only to researchers affiliated with the library or ar-
chives, but also to other persons doing research in a specialized
field. (3) The reproduction or distribution of the work includes a
notice of copyright." By negative inference all other reproductions
44. Copyright Act, supra note 3, at § 108(a). Additionally, section 108(a)(1) has
raised questions as to the status of photocopying done by or for libraries or archival
collections affiliated with industrial, profitmaking, or proprietary institutions such as
the research and development departments of chemical, pharmaceutical, automobile,
and oil corporations, the library of a proprietary hospital, the collections owned by a
law or medical partnership, etc. In this context, the House Report sets forth Congres-
sional intent as to the meaning of "indirect commercial advantage." It states that:
There is a direct interrelationship between this problem and the prohibi-
tions against "multiple" and "systematic" photocopying in section 108(g)(1)
and (2). Under section 108, a library in a profit-making organization would
not be authorized to:
(a) use a single subscription or copy to supply its employees
with multiple copies of material relevant to their work; or
(b) use a single subscription or copy to supply its employees,
on request, with single copies of material relevant to their
work, where the arrangement is "systematic" in the sense of
deliberately substituting photocopying for subscription or
purchase; or
(c) use "interlibrary loan" arrangements for obtaining
photocopies in such aggregate quantities as to substitute for
subscriptions or purchase of material needed by employees
in their work.
Moreover, a library in a profit-making organization could not evade these
obligations by installing reproducing equipment on its premises for un-
supervised use by the organization's staff. Isolated, spontaneous making
of single photocopies by a library in a for-profit organization, without any
systematic effort to substitute photocopying for subscriptions or pur-
chases, would be covered by section 108 [(a) and (g)] even though the -
copies are furnished to the employees of the organization for use in their
work. Similarly, for-profit libraries could participate in interlibrary ar-
rangements for exchange of photocopies, as long as the production or
distribution was not "systematic." These activities, by themselves, would
1977]
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or distributions would constitute an actionable enfringement of
copyright.'5
A purely commercial enterprise could not establish a collection
of copyrighted works, call itself a library or archive, and engage in
for-profit reproduction and distribution of photocopies. Such an
operation would be providing reproductions for the purpose of
direct commercial advantage. Similarly, it would not be possible for
a non-profit institution, by means of contractual arrangements with
a commercial copying enterprise, to authorize- the enterprise to
carry out copying and distribution functions that would be exempt if
conducted by the non-profit institution itself.
The new law delineates several other conditions under which
single copies of copyrighted materials may be non-commercially
reproduced by librarians. It is not an infringement of copyright for a
library or archives or its employees to reproduce a single copy of an
unpublished work in its collection, when it is done solely for pur-
poses of conservation or for deposit or research use in another
library.' Reproduction is authorized for purposes of replacement of
a published work which is deteriorating or has been lost or stolen
but only after an unsuccessful attempt is made to replace it at a fairprice.' An entire work may be reproduced if it has been established
that a copy can not be obtained at a fair price, i.e., out-of-print, after
reasonable investigation."
Librarians are relieved from an obligation to supervise
photocopying under certain conditions. A library or archives or its
employees are exempted from liability for the unsupervised use of
ordinarily not be considered "for direct or indirect commercial advan-
tages," since the "advantage" referred to in this clause must attach to the
immediate commercial motivation behind the reproduction or distribution
itself, rather than to the ultimate profit-making motivation behind the
enterprise in which the library is located. On the other hand, section 108
would not excuse reproduction or distribution if there were a commercial
motive behind the actual making or distributing of the copies, if multiple
copies were made or distributed, or if the photocopying activities were
"systematic" in the sense that their aim was to substitute for subscrip-
tions or purchases.
HOUSE REPORT, 8upra note 30, at 74-75.
45. Id
46. Id at § 108(b).
47. Id at § 108(c).
48. Id at § 108(e). Note, however, that the use of such reproduced material is
subject to the same restrictions and'warnings as required by § 108(d). For a full discus-
sion see note 50 infra and accompanying text.
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reproducing equipment located on its premises." This exemption ap-
plies only if a notice is prominently displayed near the equipment, to
the effect, that the unauthorized making of a copy of a copyrighted
work may be an infringement of the copyright law. It should be
noted, however, that this exemption from liability if infringement of
copyright results applies only to the library and its employees. The
individual making such an unauthorized copy may well be liable.
There is an explicit provision for single copies used in in-
terlibrary loan arrangements subject to certain limitations. It is per-
missible to reproduce an article, a short work in a copyrighted col-
lection, or an issue of a periodical for distribution through an in-
terlibrary loan. The copy must become the property of the user,
however, and cannot merely be lent-out and later recirculated. The
use of the reproduction is limited to private study, scholarship or
research. Additionally, the library or archives must prominently
display a warning of copyright both at the place where the orders
are accepted and on the order form itself." On the other hand, the
new law emphatically disables members of a network or consortium
from sharing resources through interlibrary loan transactions in-
volving multiple photocopies. Section 108(g)(1) states that the limited
privilege of one library to reproduce and distribute single copies of
journal articles and small parts of other copyrighted works to other
libraries in interlibrary loan transactions does not extend "to cases
where the library or archives ... is engaging in the related or con-
certed reproduction or distribution of multiple copies . . .of the
same material ... over a period of time." Section 108(g)(2) prohibits
a library or archives or its employees from engaging in the
"systematic reproduction or distribution of single or multiple copies.
S* ." The adverse effect upon interlibrary loan arrangements is
readily apparent. The House Report indicates that this section
''provoked a storm of controversy centering around the extent to
which the restrictions on 'systematic' activities would prevent the
continuation and development of interlibrary networks and other ar-
rangements involving the exchange of photocopies."5 1 In response to
this controversy, there is a proviso in section 108(gX2) stating that
nothing in this section "prevents a library or archives from par-
ticipating in interlibrary arrangements that do not have, as their
purpose or effect, that the library or archives receiving such copies
or phonorecords . . . does so in such aggregate quantities as to
49. Copyright Act, supra note 3, at § 108(f).
50. IM at § 108(d).
51. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 30, at 77-78.
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substitute for a subscription to or purchase of such work."" Par-
ticipating institutions are seemingly free to exchange multiple
copies if they do not do so to avoid purchasing new acquisitions.
Congress clarified this situation in the House Conference
Report which created guidelines embodying an agreement reached
among the representatives of library, publisher and author organiza-
tions with the encouragement of the National Commission on New
Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works (CONTU) and under its
aegis." The agreement is reflected in the "Guidelines" interpreting
the provisions of subsection 108(gX2) and allows a "requesting"
library to obtain on interlibrary loan at least five copies during a
calendar year of an article published in a periodical within five years
prior to the date of the request. Receipt of a sixth copy will be con-
sidered as a violation of systematic photocopying of copyrighted
materials to the extent that the library receiving such sixth or addi-
tional copies "does so in such aggregate quantities as to substitute
for a subscription of or purchase of such work.",
Copyright Royalty Tribunal
The new law creates a Copyright Royalty Tribunal. Its function
will be to determine whether copyright royalty rates in connection
with sound recordings of music, playings on jukeboxes and cable
television are reasonable and, if not, to adjust them.u In certain cir-
cumstances, the Tribunal will determine the distribution of those
statutory royalty fees deposited with the Register of Copyrights."
Also established is a form of compulsory licensing for the use of
music and graphic works by non-commercial broadcasters, with the
terms and rates of the licenses also to be set ultimately by this
Tribunal if the copyright owners and public broadcasting entities do
not reach voluntary agreement." An apparent trend toward more
governmental intervention is discernable by the creation of the
Tribunal and requirements for more compulsory licenses in the
Copyright field.
52. Id at 78.
53. General Revision of the Copyright Law, Title 17 of the United States
Code, H.R. CONF. REP. No. 94-1733, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 70-74 reprinted in [1976] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5811-5815.
54. Id at 72-73.
55. Copyright Act, supra note 3, at § 801.
56. Id
57. Id at § 118.
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Sound Recordings and Recording Rights in Music
The old law did not protect sound recording copyrights until
the Sound Recording Amendment of 1971." This amendment marked
the first recognition in federal copyright law of sound recordings as
copyrightable works. The new law retains the added provisions and
accords protection against unauthorized duplication." It also raises
the statutory royalty of compulsory license from the previous rate
of two cents to a rate of two and three-fourth cents or one half cent
per minute of playing time, whichever amount is larger.
The new law does not, however, create a performance right for
sound recordings as such." The lack of such protection has been
criticized by some of the leaders in the United States music industry
as being a factor in discouraging young people from studying and
making a career in professional music. When the interests of these
people were brought before the congressional committee, such a
strong case was made that it would appear now that within the next
few years we will see an amendment to the Copyright Act securing
some modicum of recompense for their efforts. An interesting aspect
of the appearances before the Committee on the Judiciary was a
performance given by Julie London which demonstrated just how
much the individual performer can contribute over and above the
contribution of the author of the music itself." Miss London gave a
highly imaginative and very sultry rendition of the Mickey Mouse
Club theme song."
Exempt Performances and Face-to-Face Teaching Activities
The new law accords the copyright owner comprehensive
rights, exclusive in nature, concerning public performance of their
works." It also removes the old law's general exemption regarding
not "for profit" public performances of non-dramatic literary and
musical works. Several specific exemptions for certain types of non-
profit uses, however, are provided. Thus, it is not an infringement of
copyright if the performance or display of a work by instructors or
58. See PuB. L. No. 92-140, § 1(f) & (n), 85 Stat. 391 (1971) (amending 17 U.S.C.
§ 1, 5 (1970)).
59. Copyright Act, supra note 3, at § 102(a)(7).
60. Id. at § 114(a).
61. Copyright Law Revision: Hearings on S.597 Before the Subcomm. on
Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st
Sess. 818-819 (1967) (Statement of Julie London).
62. Id
63. See Copyright Act, supra note 3, at § 106(4) & (5).
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pupils occurs in the course of face-to-face teaching activities of a
nonprofit educational institution, in a classroom or similar place
devoted to instruction."
The House Report provides the framework for interpreting the
language of this exemption. The term "instructors" is intended to be
broad enough to cover a guest lecturer and the like. Outside per-
formers can not, however, be brought in order to successfully avoid
copyright infringement. In general, the term "pupils" refers to the
enrolled members of a class." The "Face to Face" provision excludes
broadcasting and other transmissions, whether radio or television,
open or closed circuit, from an outside location into a classroom."
The exemption does, however, extend to the use of devices for
amplyifying or reproducing sound and for projecting visual images,
provided that the intructor and the students are in the same area. 7
Certain types of public performances and displays because of
their noncommercial or special nature are exempted." Included
under this exemption are the performances of a non-dramatic
literary or musical work and displays of a work transmitted as a
regular part of the systematic instructional activities of a govern-
mental body or a nonprofit educational institution. This exemption,
however, only applies if used as part of the teaching content and
primarily for reception in classrooms or for disabled persons or to
governmental employees as part of their official duties. Also exemp-
ted are: performances for religious services of non-dramatic literary
or musical works or of a dramatico-musical work of religious nature;
not-for-profit performances of nondramatic literary and musical
works other than a transmission to the public; provided neither per-
formers, promoters or organizers are paid or compensated and there
is no admission charge, or where there is a charge, if the net pro-
ceeds are for educational, religious, or charitable purposes." Never-
theless, even in an exempted activity, if the copyright owner objects
to the performance in writing, the performance is no longer ex-
empt.70
Other exemptions include communications to the public of a
transmission of a multiple performance (secondary transmission) on
64. Id at § 110(1).
65. See HousE REPORT, aupra note 30, at 82.
66. Id at 81.
67. Id
68. Copyright Act, supra note 3, at § 110.
69. Id. at § 110(4).
70. Id at § 110(4MB).
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a single private receiving set, unless a charge is made or the com-
munications go beyond the place where the receiving apparatus is
located.71 Performances of a nondramatic literary work, specially
designed for blind or other handicapped persons unable to read nor-
mal, printed material, or designed for the deaf or other handicapped
persons unable to hear also are exempt, if the performances are non-
profit and the transmissions are made through the facilities of a non-
commercial educational broadcast station or a cable system." The
new law also gives broadcasting organizations a limited privilege of
making "ephemeral recordings" of their broadcasts."8
Jukebox Royalty
For the first time, the new law requires the operator of a coin-
operated phonorecord player to obtain a compulsory license to per-
form the copyrighted music publicly on the phonorecord player. The
owner must file an application, affix the certificate to the machine,
and pay an annual royalty fee of eight dollars per jukebox to the
Register of Copyrights for later distribution by the Copyright
Royalty Tribunal to the copyright owners. If such performances are
made available on a particular phonorecord player after July 1 of
any year, the royalty fee deposited for the remainder of that year
shall be four dollars."'
Cable Television and Secondary Transmission
The complex and economically significant problem of "secon-
dary transmission" is dealt with in section 111." For the most part,
this section is directed to the operation of cable television systems
(CATV) and the terms and conditions of their liability for the
retransmission of copyrighted works. A compulsory license for cable
systems has hereby been established. The new law provides that
any secondary transmission made to the public by a cable system, of
a primary transmission made by a broadcast station licensed by the
FCC or by an appropriate governmental authority of Canada or
Mexico, is subject to compulsory licensing. 6 The CATV operators
71. Id. at § 110(5).
72. Id. at § 110(8).
73. Id. at § 112.
74. Id at § 116.
75. Id. at § 111(f) defines "secondary transmission as "the further transmitting
of a primary transmission simultaneously with the primary transmission, or non-
simultaneously with the primary transmission if by a 'cable system'...
76. Copyright Act, supra note 3, at § 111(c).
1977]
Tseng: What Everyone Should Know about the Copyright Law in Wonderland
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1977
18 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol.12
are required to identify and record, then deposit with the Register
of Copyrights a semi-annual statement of account, and finally, to
make royalty fee payments for the period covered by the statement
of account." The compulsory license provision would apply only to
the broadcast of the signals comprising the secondary transmission
which is permissible under the rules and regulations of the FCC.
Furthermore, the royalty payments are computed on the basis of
specified percentages of the gross receipts from cable subscribers
during the period covered by the statement."' For purposes of com-
puting royalty payments, only receipts concerning the basic service
of providing secondary transmissions of primary broadcast transmit-
ters are to be considered. Other receipts from subscribers, such as
those for pay-cable services or installation charges, are not included
in gross receipts."
Certain secondary transmissions receive general exemptions."
The first of these applies to secondary transmissions consisting "en-
tirely of the relaying, by the management of a hotel, apartment
house, or similar establishment" of a transmission to the private
lodgings of guests or residents and provided "no direct charge is
made to see or hear the secondary transmission."' This exemption
is not applicable if the secondary transmission consists of anything
other than the mere relay of ordinary broadcasts. The deletion of
advertising, the addition of new commercials, or any other change in
the signal relayed would subject the secondary transmitter to full
liability. Moreover, the term "private lodgings" is limited to rooms
used as living quarters or for private parties, and does not include
dining rooms, meeting halls, theatres, ballrooms, or similar places
that are outside of the normal circle of a family and its social ac-
quaintances." Three further exemptions are provided for secondary
transmissions." First, an instructional transmission is exempt
whether "primary or secondary" so long as it falls within the scope
of section 110(2)." Second, a carrier is exempt if it "has no direct or
indirect control over the content or selection of the primary
transmission or over the particular recipients of the secondary
transmission." For this purpose, its activities must "consist solely of
77. Id. at § 111(d).
78. Id.
79. See HOUSE REPORT. supra note 30, at 96.
80. Copyright Act, aupra note 3, at § 111(a).
81. I& at § 111(a)(1).
82. HOUSE REPORT. supra note 30, at 91-92.
83. Copyright Act, supra note 3, at § 111(a) (24).
84. Id. at § 111(aX2).
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providing wires, cables, or other communications channels for the
use of others." " Third, the operations of non-profit "translators" or
"boosters," which do nothing more than amplify broadcast signals
and retransmit them to everyone in an area for free reception,
would be exempt if there is no charge to the recipients "other than
assessments necessary to defray the actual and reasonable costs of
maintaining and operating the secondary transmission service.""
This last exemption, however, would not apply to a cable television
system."
Notice of Copyright
The new law retains the requirement that notice of copyright
must appear on all publicly distributed copies. The form of this
notice shall consist of the copyright symbol, the year of first publica-
tion, and the name of the copyright proprietor." The copyright sym-
bol may be © (the letter C in a circle) or the word "Copyright", or
the abbreviations "Corp.";" for sound recordings, the symbol @ (the
letter P in a circle) must be used." The year date may be omitted,
however, where a pictorial, graphic or sculptural work, with accom-
panying text matter, if any, is reproduced in or on greeting cards,
postcards, stationery, jewelry, dolls, toys or any useful articles. In
cases involving compilations or derivative works incorporating
previously published material, the year of first publication of the
compilation or derivative work is sufficient. 1
With respect to the notice provisions, the new law merely re-
quires the symbol to be affixed in a manner and location that will
give reasonable notice of the claim of copyright. The Register shall
prescribe by regulation how this is to be done."
It is noteworthy that the outright omission of a copyright
notice does not automatically forfeit copyright protection and cast
the work into the public domain. Not only does this represent a ma-
jor change in the theoretical framework of American copyright law,
but it also seems certain to have immediate practical consequences
in a great many individual cases. Omission of notice, whether inten-
85. L at § 111(aX3).
86. I& at § 111(aX4).
87. 1I
88. See Copyright Act, supra note 3, at § 401(b).
89. Id
90. Id. at § 402(b).
91. Copyright Act, supra note 3 at § 402(b)(1).
92. Id at § 401(c).
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tional or unintentional, does not invalidate the copyright if either of
two conditions is met: (1) if "no more than a relatively small
number" of copies or phonorecords have been publicly distributed
without notice; or (2) if registration for the work has already been
made, or is made within five years after the publication without
notice, and a reasonable effort is made to add notice to copies or
phonorecords publicly distributed in the United States after the
omission is discovered." Thus, if notice is omitted from more than a
"relatively small number" of copies or phonorecords, copyright is
not lost immediately, but the work will go into the public domain if
no effort is made to correct the error or if the work is not
registered within five years.
Innocent infringement of a work without notice is a defense to
an action for actual or statutory damages." The burden is on the in-
nocent infringer to prove that he did not have actual notice of the
copyright and that he was misled by the lack of notice in order for
the defense to prove that he did not have actual notice of the
copyright and that he was misled by the lack of notice in order for
the defense to be effective.
When a notice of copyright is defective because the name or
date has been incorrectly stated, the result, while fatal under the
old law, is not so under the new law. The validity or ownership of
the copyright is protected where the registration has been made in
the name of the true owner or where "a document executed by the
person named in the notice and showing the ownership of the
copyright has been recorded" in spite of defective notice." Defects
due to wrongly stated dates include antidated and postdated notice.
When the year in the notice is earlier than the year of first publica-
tion, however, the statutory term is computed from the year given
in the notice." It is evident that this applies to anonymous works,
pseudonymous works, and works made for hire." When the year in
the notice is one more than the year of first publication, it is treated
as if the notice had been omitted" and is governed by section 405.
When the name or date is omitted from the notice, section 406(c)
provides that the work is considered by statute to have been
published without any notice."
93. Id. at § 405(a).
94. Id at § 405(b).
95. Id at § 406(a).
96. Id at § 406(b).
97. See Id. at § 302(c).
98. See notes 93 and 94 supra and accompanying text.
99. Copyright Act, aupra note 3, at § 406(c).




Unlike the old law, deposit and registration are treated as
separate procedures under the new law, but the two can be combin-
ed. Neither deposit nor registration will be a condition to copyright
protection. Deposit is mandatory within three months after the
work is first published in the United States with a notice of the
copyright. Two copies of the best edition are to be deposited.'" Fur-
thermore, the Register may make a written demand for the required
deposit and failure to comply would result in penalty to the
defaulting party. A find up to $250 for each work, plus the total
retail price of the copies demanded or the reasonable cost expended
by the Library of Congress in acquiring them, if no retail price has
been fixed, can be imposed."' 1
While registration is not mandatory, there are incentives to
register promptly. In any judicial proceedings, a certificate of
registration secured before or within five years after the first
publication constitutes prima facie evidence of the validity of the
copyright and of the facts stated in the certificate. The evidentiary
weight to be accorded a certificate of registration secured
thereafter is within the discretion of the court.'" In addition,
"registration" is not only a pre-requisite to any infringement ac-
tion,'" but is also a pre-requisite to certain remedies. '" For example,
no award of statutory damages or attorney's fees may be made for
any copyright infringment of an unpublished work commenced
before the effective date of registration, or for any copyright infr-
ingement commenced after first publication of the work and before
the effective date of its registration, unless registration is made
within three months after the first publication.1 "
Manufacturing Clause
On July 1, 1982,1" some 92 years after its embodiment into
American law as a form of trade protection for United States prin-
ting industries and American labor, the manufacturing clause will
cease to be a part of the copyright statute. During the interim
100. Id. at § 407(a).
101. Id at § 407(d).
102. Id at § 410(c).
103. Id at § 411(a).
104. Id at § 412.
105. Id
106. See Id at § 601(a). See also 122 CONG. REC. S 17253 (daily ed. Sept. 30,
1976).
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period between now and then, the manufacturing clause will be
substantially liberalized. The new law equates manufacture in
Canada with manufacture in the United States.' The requirement
of manufacture in the United States or Canada is satisfied if the set-
ting of type or the making of the plates has been performed in
either of the two countries. Furthermore, this requirement for
manufacture in the United States or Canada will apply only to
works consisting principally of nondramatic literary material in
English. Even where the work as a whole comes within the manufac-
turing requirement, those parts of it not subject to the requirement
(illustrations, foreign-language text, etc.) can be manufactured
abroad.'" The requirement will apply only to works by American
authors and will not apply where the author's permanent residence
is outside the United States or where the individual author in-
dependently arranges for first publication outside the United States
through a foreign publisher.'"
The principal sanction for failure to comply with the manufac-
turing requirements between January 1, 1978, and July 1, 1982, will
be limitations on the number of copies that can be imported. As
under the old law, the Copyright Office will issue import statements
permitting 2000 copies (500 more than under the old law) to be
brought into the United States for distribution."' The statute clearly
provides that violation of this requirement does not invalidate the
copyright."' In the event that more than 2000 copies are imported,
the copyright owner loses protection only against an infringer of
publishing rights; other rights are not affected, and even publishing
rights can be restored by manufacture and registration of a
domestic edition."3
Divisibility of Copyright
Since the old law spoke of a single "copyright""' to which the
author of a work was entitled, and referred in the singular to "the
copyright proprietor,"" 5 it was inferred that the bundle of rights"'
107. See Copyright Act, supra note 3, at § 601(a) & (c).
108. Copyright Act, supra note 3, at § 601(a).
109. Id. at § 601(b).
110. Id at § 601(bX2).
111. Id
112. Id. at § 601(d).
113. Id
114. See, e.g., old law, supra note 1, at § 10.
115. Id. at §§ 1, 2, 3, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12, 14, 19, 21, 22, 24, 25, 26, 28, 101, 107, 109,
214, 215.
116. Id. at § 1.
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which accrue to a copyright owner were "indivisible," that is, in-
capable of assignment in parts.' This "concept of indivisibility," if
literally followed, rendered it impossible to assign anything less
than the totality of rights commanded by copyright. Therefore, any
grant of rights less than the entire copyright was regarded as mere-
ly a license, and not an assignment of ownership.
The new law abolishes the "doctrine of indivisibility" entirely
and clearly states that "any of the exclusive rights comprised in a
copyright, including any subdivision of any rights specified by sec-
tion 106, may be transferred . . . and owned separately. The owner
of any particular exclusive right is entitled, to the extent of that
right, to all of the protection and remedies accorded to the
copyright owner under this title." ' 8 Consequently, infringement
takes place when any one of the rights is violated. There can no
longer be any question about an author's right to divide up a
copyright in the most remunerative way, and to retain for future
bargaining those portions that he does not wish to include in the
transfer.
CONCLUSION
Dissatisfaction with the 1909 Copyright Act appears to have
started about 1924 and continued to 1976. Looking over the myriad
of proposed revision bills over that period, it is hard to believe that
after several decades of heated debates, intensive lobbying and revi-
sion efforts, Congress finally enacted a very complex, modern, and
sophisticated copyright statute consonant with the technological ad-
vances of the century.
As the reader may have already concluded, the single most
dominant trend in this legislation has been the utilization of com-
pulsory licenses to balance the competing interests of creators and
users of copyrighted works. It contains provisions clearly intended
to induce efforts toward voluntary agreement and licensing with a
clear forewarning of government intervention should they fail."' The
new law also provides a mechanism for less drastic revision
whenever the need arises. Perhaps the most interesting legal
117. Goldwyn Pictures Corp. v. Howells Sales Co., 282 F. 9 (2d Cir. 1922); M.
Witmark & Sons v. Pastime Amusement Co., 298 F. 470 (E.D.S.C. 1924); New Fiction
Pub. Co. v. Star Co., 220 F. 994 (S.D.N.Y. 1915). See Commissioner v. Wodehouse, 337
U.S. 369 (1949); Dam v. Kirke La Shelle Co., 166 F. 589 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1908), affd 175 F.
902 (2d Cir. 1910).
118. See, e.g., Copyright Act, supra note 3, at §§ 108(i), 118(b) & (d).
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change brought about by the new law is the almost false pre-
emption of the common law copyright of the states. Overall, it is a
fine piece of legislation, but it will take time to appreciate the in-
tricacies and ramifications of the whole law. This article was intend-
ed only as a beginning point in the understanding and usage of a
complicated though vastly improved federal copyright statute.
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